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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADVERSE POSSxSSION-WHAT AcTs O STRANGERS CONSTITUTE AN INTER-

RuPTION.-Claimant by adverse possession showed that he had fenced in the
land in controversy, and had used it for pasturing cattle during a period
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Limitations. Defendant offered evidence
to show that strangers had trapped upon this land during the greater part
of this period, and that one party in particular had repeatedly set traps
there over protests of the adverse claimant, and that no action had been
successfully prosecuted against hi,-although adverse claimant had threatened to prosecute. It did not appear whether the trespasses were repeated
after this time. Held, that adverse possession had been made out, and that
the acts of strangers referred to did not constitute an interruption. Bloodsworth v. Murray, (Md., 1921), 114 Atl. 575.
The general rule as given by Cyc. is: "The intrusion of a trespasser
will in no case interrupt the continuity of an adverse possession, unless continued for such a length of time that knowledge of the intrusion is presumed, or so (continued) as to become the assertion of an adverse right.
If they (the intrusions) are known they become assertions of right and
operate to break the continuity, unless legal remedies are resorted to within
a reasonable time to regain possession, and are prosecuted to a successful
determination." i Cyc. ioli, 2 Corus Junis 98. This statement may be
found repeated in effect in not a few cases. Beard v. Ryal, 78 Ala. 37;
Woodstock Iron Co. v. Roberts, 87 Ala. 436. The basis of such a rule would
seem to be the doctrine that the holding must be hostile to the world, and
not merely to the legal owner. But with few exceptions, the cases in which
this statement of the rule is found are either cases where there have been
only isolated trespasses and so no interruption in any event, or else cases
where legal remedies had successfully been resorted to. Love v. Turner,
78 S. C. 513, 519; Sparks v. Bodensick, 72 Kan. 5, 8. On the other hand, in
the later cases where the question has been squarely presented by evidence
of continued trespasses or repeated intrusions, the courts have almost always
held that the acts in question did not constitute an interruption; and in not
a few cases have indicated that the acts of a stranger must amount to an
actual disseisin of the adverse occupant to have such an effect. Inhabitants
of Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 178; Batchelder v. Robbins, 95 Mo. 59;
Glover v. Pfeuffer, (Tex. Civ. App., 1914) 163 S. W. 984. The rule which
the latter cases seem to favor is more consonant with the modern theory
that the holding need not be hostile to the world, but merely to the title
holder. See TIFf'ANY ON R. AL PROPRTY, § 503.
AGENcy-LiAnLITY ov THIRD PERSON TO UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPA, ON
SEALED CONTRAc.---In an action for specific performance of a contract to

make a lease the complaint stated that the agent who signed the contract
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in his own name was known by defendant to have been acting as agent for
plaintiff. Demurrer sustained by lower court. Held complaint should have
been sustained as stating a cause of action. Lagumis v. Gerard (1921) 19o
N. Y. S. :2o7.
Will the court of appeals sustain this revolutionary, but very sensible,
decision of the supreme court? Judge Cropsey, on the strength of Harris
v. Shorall, 23o N. Y. 343 (I92I), thinks it will. Pound, J. there said:
"When so much of the old value and high nature of the seal has been lost,
the court should not be tenacious to preserve one of its minor incidents for
the sake of the rule, but should rather strive to give to the real agreement
of the parties." He notes, however, that there may be some reluctance to
vary an established rule, and is perhaps relieved that the instant case can
be decided on other grounds, leaving this point for final decision when a
case is presented compelling a decision. Laginmis v. Gerard is not the only
New York case allowing an action by an undisclosed principal on a contract
under seal, but on which a seal was unnecessary. See. e. g. Campbell v.
Poland Spring Co., 187 N. Y. S. 643 (1921).
But the court of appeals as
late as Case v. Case, 2o3 N. Y. 263 (191i)held that "nothing is more definitely settled in our law than that an instrument under seal cannot be
enforced by or against one who is not a party to it. This is so elementary
as to be axiomatic." This case has been cited at least nine times by New
York inferior courts, though often to make distinctions taking the case out
of the rule. See Staff v. Beis
Realty Co., 183 N. Y. S. 886; O'Grady v.
Howe Company; 152 N. Y. S. 79; Lockwood v. Smitl, 143 N. Y. S. 480.
The instant case, however, is the first in New York to take the rule as
to sealed instruments by the collar and pitch it out of court as "an arbitrary,
unreasonable rule, which never accomplishes any good, and is used only to
prevent the administration of justice." In some other jurisdictions courts
have accomplished as much without saying so with such brutal frankness.
Woolsey v. Henke, 125 Wis. 134.
AetnaI, AND ERROa-CM PMI NT EVIDZNCX EXCLUDI--ERROR PF-SuMED
PXTJUDIc.-The appellant in a civil suit assigned as error the exclusion
of competent, material evidence offered by him. Held, case must be reversed,
for error is presumed prejudicial unless from the record it appears that the
error has worked no prejudice to the objecting party. Borough v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., (Ia. 1921) 184 N. W. 320.
To secure a reversal in the early common law because of error in the
exclusion of competent evidence, the appellant had to show that its admission would probably have resulted in a judgment in his favor. Tyrwhitt v.
Wynne, (1819) 2 Barn. & Ald. 554, and where incompetent evidence was
admitted, the court refused a new trial when there was sufficient evidence,
without that erroneously admitted, to warrant the finding of the jury. Doe
v. Tyler, (183o) 6 Bing. 561, but the court rejected these salutary rules in
Crease v. Barrett, (835)
1 Crompton M. & R. 9iS, because of a fear that
the courts would assume the duties of the jury and that a careless treatment
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of the rules of evidence would result. According to Mr. Wigmore this case
"announced a rule which in spirit and later interpretation signified that an
error of ruling created per se for the excepting and defeated party a right
to a new trial." I WIGI O ON EVmIDNC4 § 21. This rule was changed in
England by the Judicature Act, 1875, Rules of Court, Order 39, rule 3, which
provides: "A new trial shall not be granted on the ground of misdirection
or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, unless in the opinion
of the Court to which the application is made some substantial wrong or
miscarriage has been thereby occasioned in the trial of the action; * * *"
The courts in the United States quite universally followed the regrettable
"heresy that error in a ruling on evidence is presumed prejudicial. Ellis
v. Short, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 142; Bolton v. Cuthbert, 132 Ala. 403; Callaway
& Truitt v. Gay, 143 Ala. 524; St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Steed, lO5

Ark. 205. And some courts with common law tenacity still cling to the rule
notwithstanding statutes requiring them to disregard all errors not affecting
the substantial rights of the adverse party. See Hatch v. Bayless, 164 Mo.
App. 2r6; Reed v. Reed, xoi Mo. App. 176; and Missouri, R. S. x899, Sect.
865. Also, Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Hiatt, Admr., 65 Ind. App. 233;
and Indiana, R. S.1881, Sect. i8gi. The same is true of the principal case.
See Iowa, Compiled Code, 9ig,Sect. 7244. Some statutes, with more specific provisions, seem to insure against such practice, e. g. Michigan, Compiled Laws 1915, § 13763 provides: "No judgment or verdict shall be set
aside or reversed, or a new trial be granted by any court in any civil case,
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or
rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire
cause it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice." The rule in this form is approved and recommended for both civil and criminal cases by the American Bar Association.
Reports of American Bar Association, 19o8, p. 542. The federal courts also
held that error on a ruling was presumed prejudicial. National Biscuit Co.
v. Nolan, 138 Fed. 6; Inman Bros. v. Dudley & Daniels Lumber Co., 146
Fed. 449. But in Press Pub. Co. v. Monteith, i8o Fed. 356, the court said,
"The defendant * * * invokes the archaic rule that if error be discovered,
no matter how trivial, prejudice must be presumed. The more rational and
enlightened view is that in order to justify a reversal the court must be able
to conclude that the error is so substantial as to affect injuriously the appellant's rights. Prejudice must be perceived, not presumed or imagined."
Accord: Miller v. Continental Shipbuilding Corporation,265 Fed. 158, where
incompetent evidence was admitted. Under the compulsion of statutes, many
state courts have adopted this sensible rule. Byers v. Tert'itory, i Okla. Crim.
Rep. 698; Cox v. Chase, 99 Kan. 740; Koepp v. National Enameling and
Stamping Co., 151 Wis. 302. It has been incorporated into the court rules
by some courts. Alabama, Supreme Court Rules, Rule 45, 175 Ala. xxi;
Mississippi, Supreme Court Rules, Rule .ii, 1O Miss. 96. For an interesting
case, see Jones v. State, 1o4 Miss. 871, and note, L. R. A. 1918 B 388.
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BREACH OF PROMI5S To MARRY-ILLNElSS AND DlSEASE AS A DVFNSE.After P and D had been engaged to be married for a number of years D
refused to marry P and she brought an action against him for breach of
promise. D claimed that since the engagement P had become afflicted with
a goitre and that physical and mental illness unfitted her for the marital
relation. The trial court charged that P's illness, to constitute a defense,
must be permanent and incurable. The appellate court held this error, that
where disease or physical disability, rendering it unsafe or improper to
marry, has developed in either party subsequent to the making of the contract, the other party will be required to wait a reasonable time for a cure
to be effected and, if the disease proves to be of a permanent character, may
refuse to carry out the contract. Fellers v. Howe, (Neb., 1921), 184 N.
W. 122.

There are but few reported cases in which the ill health of the plaintiff
has been urged by the defendant as a defense. In a case in which the
plaintiff had become afflicted with a floating kidney rendering her nervous
and physically weakened, it was held that if the defendant waited a reasonable time for the plaintiff to recover, and she did not, he was justified in breaking the engagement. Travis v. Schnebly, 68 Wash. i. In that case the court said,
"A man who has only agreed to marry a healthy woman should not be
compelled to accept her as his wife should she become an invalid before
marriage." But if the defendant knew of the plaintiff's ill health at the
time the promise was made it is no defense. Lemke v. Franzenburg, 159
Iowa 466. Where the plaintiff has a disease of a character which makes her
marriage to the defendant contrary to public policy or eugenics it is clearly
a valid defense. Kantzler v. Grant, (syphilis), 2 Ill. App. 236; Goddard v.
Westcott, (cancer), 82 Mich. i8o; Jefferson v. Paskell, (tuberculosis),
[i9i6] i K. B. 57. In such cases it has been held a defense even if the
defendant knew of it at the time the contract was made. Grover v. Zook,
(tuberculosis), 44 Wash. 489. Where the plaintiff has a physical impediment to marriage it has likewise been held a defense. Gring v. Lerch, 112
Pa. St. 244; Edmonds v. Hughes, 115 Ky. 561. As indicated in the principal
case it is not necessary that the ailment of the plaintiff be incurable. Gring
v. Lerch, supra; Travis v. Schnebly, mpra. While it was not decided in
the principal case, the court intimates that it would have considered the
plaintiff's affliction and illness a bar to her action had it been established
by the evidence. Such a holding would obviously go farther than the case
in which the plaintiff's marriage would be contrary to eugenics, or where
there exists a physical impediment. However, it finds support in Travis v.
Schnebly, supra, and seems right on principle unless, of course, carried too
far. The weight of authority holds that if the defendant, without fault on
his part, has become afflicted after the making of the contract with a disease
which renders his marriage contrary to public policy, it is a good defense
to a suit for breach of promise. Traminell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214;
Gardner v. Arnett, 21 Ky. L. Rep. I; In re Oldfield's Estate, 175 Iowa 118.
See also 14 MICH. L. Riv. 666.
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CARRIrRS-TaLGRAPH-LImITATION or LIABILITY ACCORDING TO FILtD
TARirr RATEs WHERE SENDER DID NOT ASSENT TO OR KNOW Or SUCH LImITATION.-The respondent had sent a cablegram, the message being unre-

peated, and as a result of appellant's negligent error in transmission suffered a loss of $31,ooo. The appellant had filed tariff rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission limiting their liability for an error in an unrepeated message to the portion of the tolls which it received for the transmission of the message. The appellee did not use a blank containing this
stipulation, and neither assented to nor knew of the limited liability. Held
that appellee was bound by the stipulation. Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Bsteve Bros. & Co. (U. S., 192), 41 Sup. Ct. 584.
Even after the act of igio placed telegraph and telephone companies
under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the state
courts refused to uphold stipulations limiting liability for negligence, in the
absence of a supreme court decision on the matter. i8 MIcH. L. REv. 248.
The principal case is the first supreme court decision to affirm directly and
positively the validity of such stipulations for limited liability, although
there have been previous intimations that this stand would be taken in
accordance with the decisions involving other carriers. 18 MIcH. L. Riv.
418. It has been held that a message sent between two points in the same
state and passing through a third state is an interstate message. Klippel
v. Western Union Telegraph Co+ io6 Kan. 6; I8 MIcH. L. Rv. 559. It is
held that the limitation of liability is binding upon the addressee as well
as the sender. Kiotz v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 187 Iowa 1355. The
federal court held that in the case of an intrastate telegram it was not
bound by the decisions in the state courts of Ohio, and in the absence of a
statute in the state prohibiting such stipulations, the limitation of liability for
unrepeated messages was binding. Friedlanderv. Postal-TelegraphCable Co.,
-71 Fed. 954. It is held, however, that stipulations limiting recovery to the
cost of an unrepeated message do not excuse the carrier from liability for
full damages, when the damages resulted from a total failure to transmit
the message, as distinguished from an error in the course of transmission.
C zizek v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1921), 272 Fed. 223. The principal
case also applies to telegraph companies the holding in Boston & Me. R.
Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, i. e. that the stipulation limiting liability is
binding regardless of the absence of assent or notice, because of the desirability of upholding uniform rates which are presumed to be reasonable
from their having been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
But in the principal case the court points out that telegraph companies are
not required to file their rates. Accordingly a later case, upon the authority
of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., supra, goes still
further, holding that the stipulation is valid and binding even though the
rates were not filed with the commission, and as in the principal case that
assent to the stipulation was not necessary, the message being phoned to
the telegraph company, and the sender having no knowledge of any limitation of liability. Grand Rapids Showcase Co. v. Postal-Telegraph Cable Co.
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(Mich. 1921), 183 N. W. 73'. The force of filed rates is seen by the holding
that the consignee -Was liable to pay the full amount of freight according
to the filed rates, although it had previously paid all the charges asked by
the carrier. N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co.,
41 Sup. Ct. 5o9, and also by the holding that the carrier could recover
freight from the consignor, when it had agreed to recover it from third
parties who could not meet the full claim. Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Lightfoot et al. (Mo. 1921), :232 S. W. 176. The principal case is in accord with
the previous views of the supreme court as to the right of other carriers
to limit their liability, and to enforce their stipulations regardless of assent
or dissent, although it is subject to what appear to be the reasonbale and
sound objections of Justice Pitney in his dissent to Boston & Maine R. Co.
v. Hooker, supra.
CHILD--M4ANING OP IN STATUTZ ALLOWING ACTION rOR DATH.-A statute gave to the wife, husband, parent or child of the deceased a right of
action for death by wrongful act Another statute allowed illegitimate children and their issue to inherit from their mother and from each -other.
Plaintiff was the mother of an illegitimate child killed through the negligence of defendant. Held, plaintiff had no cause of action. State for use
of Smith v. Hagerstozmn & F. Ry. Co., (Md., 19i2) 114 At. 729.

In another very recent case, Panama Ry. Co. v. Castilla, 272 Fed. 656,
the court held that as there was no statute in the Canal Zone making a bastard child legitimate as td its mother, she could not recover for her child's
death by wrongful act of defendant. Undoubtedly the majority of decided
cases in point in this country and England are in accord with the instant
case, but it is submitted that they are based upon an unwise policy and an
unfortunate following of bad precedent. For authorities and more extended
discussion, see 19 MICH. L. RXV. 562.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-lDERAL

TAX

LAW

EVB'CTING REGULATION

OF

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.-Plaintiff soughft an injunction to restrain
collection of a tax levied pursuant to the Act of Peb. 24, i91g, § 1200 (Comp.
St. Ann. Supp. i919, 6336 7/8a), which imposed a io per cent. excise tax
on net profits of certain employers of child labor. Tax law held unconstitutional as an attempt on the part of Congress, not to collect revenue, but
to control the internal affairs of a state. Injunction granted. George v.
Bailey (i92i, W. D. N. C.), 274 Fed. 639.
The court, in the principal case, considered itself bound by Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, where the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision,
declared the Owen Keating Act unconstitutional. Purporting to exercise its
authority under the commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress had provided, in that Act, that the products of child labor should not be shipped
in interstate or foreign commerce. Though ostensibly an exercise of power
to regulate commerce, the Act was held to be an unlawful attempt by Congress to enact a police measure regulating child labor within the states.
CHILD LABOR
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Although an unlawful interference with power reserved to the states when
done directly, can this be done indirectly? The first important case directly
in point, McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27, answers affirmatively. There the
Act of Congress, apparently an exercise of taxing power, imposed a tax of
IO cents per pound upon cblored oleomargarine. The legislators knew that
instead of raising revenue, the Act would prohibit the manufacture of colored oleomargarine. But the Act was upheld, the court disclaiming any
right to say that Congress has abused a delegated power merely because
the effect of exercising it is to encroach upon a field wherein the state has
the power to legislate. The statement by Marshall in M'Culloclh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, that "* * * the power to tax involves the power to
destroy," was referred to in the McCray case. Earlier cases tended to
support the doctrine of McCray v. U. S. See, I. re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526
(requirement that packages be marked to prevent fraud, considered merely
incidental to revenue purpose of the Act) ; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S.
(8 Wall.) 533 (semble. Tax of 8% per annum on the circulation of notes
of state banks, clearly intended to drive them out of circulation. Act ultimately sustained under power of Congress to regulate coinage); Champion
v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (Lottery Ticket Law, upheld as exercise of power
over commerce); U. S. v. 288 Packages of Merry World Tobacco,'io3 Fed.
453 (Tobacco Tax Law, with provision that packages* could contain nothing
but tobacco). In 17 MIcH. L. Rev. 83 there is a clear analysis of the real
situation where powers delegated to Congress and those reserved to the
states apparently conflict. In the interim between McCray v. U. S. and
Hammer v. Dagenart,,the formidable array of cases supporting the former
would appear to leave the Dagenlart case almost inexplicable. U. S. v.
Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394 (Statute had moral end, upheld as revenue
measure) ; Steinfeldt v. U. S., 219 Fed. 879 (Narcotic Act having moral end,
sustained under commerce clause) ; U. S. v. Brown, 224 Fed. 135 (Narcotic
Act, valid under commerce or tax clause) ; Lee Mow Lin v. U. S., 25o Fed.
694 ($3o per pound tax on manufacture of opium valid) ; Hipolite Egg Co.
v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45 (Pure Food Law, valid under commerce clause);
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (Liquor regulation,
valid under commerce clause); Camnhwtti v. U. 5., 242 U. S. 470 (White
Slave Act, valid under commerce clause) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 22o U.
S. 1O7 (Semble, tax on corporations created by state). Since the Dagenhart
case a Narcotic Act has been upheld as an exercise of taxing power. U. S.
v. Rosenberg, 251 Fed. 963. Cases opposing the doctrine of McCray v. U.
S. are few. Craig v. Dimock, 47 Ill. 3o8 (semble) ; U. S. v. Doreinus, 246
Fed. 958 (Narcotic Act). For an analytical consideration of the problem
raised in McCray v. U. S., see 6 MicH. L. Rzv. 277. Even though it be conceded that the powers granted to Congress in the Constitution did not
originally admit of such exercise as was allowed in McCray v. U. S. and the
supporters of its doctrine, may we not justify those decisions and the wisdom of following them by placing upon the pertinent Constitutional provisions a sociological interpretation? See 16 MxcH. L. 1j4v. 599.
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CoNTRAcTs-IMrossIBILITY-TAcHER's CLAIM TO SALARY VOR TIME DuRING WHICH SCHOOL WAS CLOSED By HEALTH BoARD.-Plaintiff sued township
trustees under a contract for employment as school teacher, to recover salary
for twenty-seven days during which the school had been closed by the county
board of health, acting under authority granted by statute. Defense of township trustees was based upon impossibility of performance as an excuse.
Held, that the defense was good. Gregg School Tp., Morgan. Co. v. Hinshaw, (Ind., 1921) 132 N. E. 586.
Cases similar to the principal case have not been infrequent in 'recent
years. See IS MICH. L. Riv. 796. In the principal case, as in these cases
generally, the decision is put upon the ground that performance was impossible, and therefore excused. The court states as the rule that "when performance becomes impossible, non-performance is excused, and no damages
can be recovered." It is submitted, however, that performance by the trustees of the promise sued upon, viz., the promise to pay salary, was not impossible, (nor prevented by law); and furthermore, that impossibility does not
necessarily excuse in every case. The real basis for the defendant's defense
would seem to have been failure by plaintiff to perform the services which
were the condition precedent to his right to recover the salary. Amer. Mercantile Exch. v. Blunt, io2 Me. 128. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, secs. 838,
1972 and 1973. On this theory the plaintiff could recover only by showing
that he was excused from performing this condition. The only valid excuse,
in a case like the principal case, where the condition, is, at the same time the
consideration for the defendant's promise, is that the promisor has waived,
or prevented the performance of, or materially increased the difficulty of
.performing such condition precedent. Melville v. DeWolf, 4 E. & B. 844;
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24. But see Schoelkopf v.
Moerbach ,Brewing Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 267. The second criticism, which
pertains to the court's statement of the rule in regard to impossibility, raises
the much mooted question as to just how far impossibility excuses. That
the rule as here given is too broad would seem to be evident from even a
superficial examination of the authorities. Columbus Ry., Power & Light
Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U. S. 399;. Mascall v. Reitmeier, 145 Minn. 214.
To accept the language of the court as an exact statement of the rule would
involve an unwarranted extension of the limits of impossibility as a defense.
See 17 MIcE. L. Rev. 412 and 689; 18 MICH.,, L. Rv. 589, and L. R. A. 1916
F IO. It is probable that the court did not intend the rule as given to be
taken without qualifications and exceptions. If so, we can only say that
such broad, unguarded statements are to be deprecated as misleading, especially where there is no indication in the language used that the court is
speaking in general terms.
CRIMZS-INDITM4NT-ALLEGAToN

OF IMPLIED

ELEMENT

IN

STATUTORY

CRamt.-A statute required the driver of an automobile striking a person
to stop, render assistance, and give certain information on, request, and it
provided a penalty for failure to do so. The defendant was charged with
doing acts as set out in the statute, the indictment failing to allege that he
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knew he had struck anyone when he failed to stop. Held, though lack of
knowledge on the part of the defendant would be a defense, the indictment
was sufficient because the word "knowingly" did not appear in the statute
in the description of the act denounced as the offense. Scott v. State (Tex.
Cr. App., 1921) 233 S. W. 1097.
Where a statute states the elements of a crime it is generally correct to
describe the crime in the words of the statute. State v. Blackington, iII
Me. 229. But "where the words of the statute by their generality may
embrace acts which fall within the terms but not within the spirit or meaning of the statute the specific facts must be alleged to bring the defendant
precisely within the inhibition of the law." State v. Doran, 99 Me. 329.
"While as a general rule it is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the
words of the statute, the information must contain a statement of the acts
constituting the offense and if the statutory Words are not sufficient it must
be expanded beyond them." Wilcox v. State, 13 Okla. Crim. 599. These
rulings are but illustrations of the general rule that the indictment must
charge a crime and so must state specifically all the facts and circumstances
necessary to constitute the offense charged. Brown; v. Williams, 31 Me. 4o3.
The principal case squarely raises the question of whether or not the indictment need allege an element construed into the statute by the court in order
to give effect to the legislative intent. When a statute specifically requires
that an act be done knowingly, knowledge must be averred to charge the
crime. Bailey v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. i9; Powers v. State, 87 Ind. 97.
James and Mollie Robeson v. State, 5o Tenn. 266, contra, on the ground that
knowledge is not an element of the offense but lack of knowledge is a
matter of defense. If knowledge must be alleged when it is mentioned in
the enactment there is no reason why it should not be alleged when the
court reads it into the act. This application of the cardinal rule of criminal
pleading, that the indictment must charge a crime, is sustained by numerous
authorities which hold that the indictment must set forth specifically even
elements of the offense that are implied by the statute as well as those that
are specified. Commonwealth v. Stout, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 247; United States
v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611; Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230; State v. Downer, 8 Vt.
424; Harrington v. State, 54 Miss. 490; Wilcox v. State, supra. Among the
cases contra are Pierce v. State, 1O Texas 556; and Halsted v. State, 41 N.
J. Law 552.
CRIMINAL LAW-JUISDICTION-DEVZNDANT ILLEGALLY BROUGHT INTO
JURISDICTION.-Petitioner while serving a sentence in the United States penitentiary at Atlanta, Ga., was taken by the warden, on a telegram from the
Attorney General and without the institution of proceedings for his removal
under Rev. ST. 1014 (ComsP. ST. 1674), into the southern district of New
York, and on his arrival there was brought into court on a writ of habeas
corputs ad prosequendemt, and was convicted for another offense. Held, that,
while he was brought into the district of trial illegally, such fact did not
affect the jurisdiction of the court to try him nor invalidate the judgment.
Ex parte Lamar, 274 Fed. 16o.
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In civil cases "the law will not permit a person to be kidnapped or
decoyed within the jurisdiction for the purpose of being compelled to answer
to a mere private claim." In re Johnson,, 167 U. S. 120. But a different rule
has always obtained in criminal cases. In one of the earlier cases, Ex parte
Susannah. Scott, 9 B. & C. 446, the question of the prisoner's right to be
released because she was illegally arrested in Belgium and brought to England was argued before Lord Tenterden. He held that where a party
charged with a crime is found in the country, it was the duty of the court
to take care that he should be amenable to justice and it could not consider
the circumstances under which he was brought there. In the United States
the decisions uniformly hold that, in criminal cases; the jurisdiction of the
court in which the offense charged was committed is not impaired by the
manner in which the accused was brought before it. IS L. R. A. 177, note.
So that "if a person is brought within the jurisdiction of one state from
another or from a foreign country, by the unlawful use of force, which
would render the officer liable to a civil action, or in a criminal proceeding
because of this forcible abduction, such fact would not prevent the trial
of the person- thus abducted in the state where he had committed that
offense." Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 596. The same doctrine was
declared in State v. Ross, 21, Iowa 467, where the court noting the distinction between civil and criminal cases said: "In the one (civil) the party
invoking the aid of the court is guilty of fraud or violence in bringing the
defendant or his property within the jurisdiction of the court. In the other
(criminal) the people, the State is guilty of no wrong." The concurrence
of opinion has seemed to proceed on the ground that the offender against
the law of the state is not relieved from liability because of personal injuries
received from private parties, or because of indignities committed against
another state. The question has had an interesting history in the federal
courts where relief has been sought by persons forcibly removed from one
jurisdiction to another. In Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, and Mahon v.
Justice, 127 U. S. 70o, it was adjudged that in such a case neither the Constitution, nor the laws of the United States entitled the person so held to
be discharged from custody and allowed to depart from the jurisdiction.
In Lascelles v. Georgia, 149 U. S. 537, the same principle was announced
where a fugitive from justice, surrendered upon a requisition charging him
with the commission of a specific crime, had been tried for a different crime
by the state to which he had been returned. In Pettibone v. Nichols, 2o3 U.
S. I92, Justice McKenna dissenting, counsel attempted to distinguish this
case on the ground suggested in State v. Ross, supra, and contended that
the states through their officers were the offenders in"effecting the abduction, but the court held that it could not properly inquire into the methods
by which the state obtained custody of the defendant. Mr. Justice McKenna
dissenting said, "the distinction is important to observe," for, as he remarks,
"no individual or individuals could have accomplished what the power of
two states accomplished." However, as suggested in the principal case the
controlling- considerations are those of public policy and "the interest of
the public overrides that which is, after all, a mere privilege from arrest."
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EVID4NC-OPINION-WHMTHER

AUTOMOBILZ

COULD HAVz Bt4N

STOPED

SooNEP-In a suit against. D for running over and killing P's infant son,

D was asked by his attorney whether he could have stopped the automobile
sooner than he did. Upon objection, the court held, that the question was
improper since it called for conclusions which should be drawn by the jury
from the facts given by the witness. Taylor v. Lewis, (Ala., 192), 89 So. 581.
The general rule is that a witness must be confined to a statement of
the facts and will not be permitted to testify to opinions, inferences, or conclusions based on the facts. See 3 WIGMoai, EviD., § 1917. When all the
facts are before the jury it is superfluous to add, by way of testimony, inferences which the jury can equally well draw for themselves. 3 WVIGMOR,
Evw., § i918; 1 GR NLEAF, EVrn., § 441 b. The reason is not that it is
attempting to usurp the functions of the jury, as the principal case intimates.
Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459. Nor is it because an opinion should not
be given on the very issue before the jury. Snow v. Boston and Maine R.
Co., 65 Me. 23o. It is merely because the testimony is superfluous and
unnecessary. However, in the principal case it would seem-that it would
be impossible to place before the jury all the facts upon which the possibility of stopping the automobile depended, and if the inference of a witness
would be helpful to them it should be admitted.

3 WIGMOR4, EvID., § 1921.

Witnesses of ordinary 'ability may testify as to the speed of automobiles.
Denver, 0. & C. Co. v. Krebs, 255 Fed. 543; Creedon v. Galvin, 226 Mass.
I4O; 3 CHAMBMDLAYNZ, EVID., § 2o86. But a witness must be shown to be
especially fitted by experience in operation to testify as to the distance in

which one may be stopped.

Goldblatt v. Brocklebank, 166 Ill. App. 315;

Hamilton, H. & Co. v. Larrimer, 183 Ind. 429; BtaaY, AuTrooau s, 1012.

Had the defendant been shown thus qualified it would seem that his opinion
should have been admitted. Scholl v. Grayson, 147 Mo. App. 652; Crandall
v. Krause, 165 Ill. App. I5.
EVIDENC-WITNZSSXS-COURT
CAS4 TO SUBJECT HEaRSL

CANNOT REQUIRE PROSFCUTR x

To EXAMINATION

iN

RAPx

BY PHYslCIAN.-Prosecutrix

in

a rape case denied that she had previous intercourse with accused, and
asserted she had never had intercourse with any man. Accused then
requested that court order the prosecutrix to undergo a physical examination, asserting that if the examination revealed the fact that she was not
virtuous it would support the theory that she had been indulging in sexual
intercourse with defendant, and tend to discredit her testimony as to the
alleged assault. Held, there is no rule of law that would authorize the trial
judge to require a witness to subject herself to such an examination, or
any right to enforce such an order if made. Rettig v. State (Tex. I92I),

233 S. W. 839.
Whether or-not the courts have inherent power to compel parties to submit their persons to physical examination is in conflict. In Union Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, which was a civil action for injury to the
person, the court refused to give such an, order on the ground that the power
to compel a physical examination was "never known to the common law,
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except in a very small number of cases based upon special reasons and upon
ancient practice, coming down from ruder ages, now mostly obsolete in
England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced into this country."
The majority of courts, however, in civil actions for injuries to the person,
assert that the court does have the power to compel the plaintiff to undergo
a physical examination. Schroeder v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 47 Ia. 375;
3
IVICoIo
ON Ev., § 222o. This power has also been exercised by the courts
when the marriage relation has been sought to be annulled on the ground
of impotency or incapacity to perform the marital act. See note to Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Huddleston, 68 A. S. R. 251. The courts, however, have
been very reluctant to exercise this power in rape or cognate offenses where
the prosecutrix has nothing to gain. In McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, the
court said: "It may well be doubted in rape cases whether the court has
power to make an order compelling the inspection of the private person
of a prosecutrix, in the event of her refusal to submit to such examination.
If such right exists at all, we should hold it to be a matter of judicial discretion, to be exercised only in cases of extreme necessity, and not a subject of review on appeal to this court." The court has also refused to grant
such an order on the ground of public policy because "modest women would
oftentimes doubtless prefer to bear with the wrong visited upon them than
to expose themselves to the humiliation of a physical examination." Thomas
v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 5o9. And in prosecutions for slander the court
has refused to order the prosecutrix to submit to a physical examination.
Kern v. Bridwell, 119 Ind. 226. One reason why the courts more readily
order a physical examination in civil cases than in criminal actions is that
the court may easily enforce its order in such cases by declaring a non-suit
should the order be disobeyed. Whether the court is without authority to
grant such an order, as is held by the principal case, may well be doubted;
it is certain that the courts have hesitated to exercise such a power.
HUSBAND AND

NrcEssAmiEs

WIFE-HusnAND's LIABnITY TO MERCHANT VOR NON-

PURCHASED By DSEgTING

WsEn.-Appellant and wife had been

married three years. During that time the wife had made two purchases
of clothing which was not necessary upon the credit of the appellant and
he had paid the bills. On the day that the wife deserted the appellant she
purchased on his credit non-necessary clothing to the value of $175.
She
started divorce proceedings three days later, and the appellant then notified
the appellee that he would no longer be responsible for debts contracted by
his wife. Held, appellant was liable for the value of the goods purchased.
Martz v. Selig Dry Goods Co. (Ind. App. 192), 131 N. E. 528.
It is well settled that the husband is liable for necessaries purchased
by his wife. As to what may constitute necessaries, see 13 MIcIH. L. REv.
262. The liability continues after a separation due to the fault of the husband, Wisnom v. McCarthy, (Cal.), 192 Pac. 337, but not unless the plaintiff
has shown that the separation was due to the husband's misconduct. Vusler
v. CoX, 53 N. J. Law 516. However, to establish liability for -non-necessaries
it must be shown that the wife was the express or implied agent of the hus-
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band. The mere marital relationship will not establish the agency. Baker
v. Witten, I Okl. i6o; Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N. Y. 75. The husband's
failure to disaffirm his responsibility for his wife's purchase of hats for his
daughter, they being non-necessaries, was held to amount to ratification, and
he was liable. Auringer v. Cochrane, 225 Mass. 273, 15 MICH. L. Rzv. 52I.The wife's authority to act as agent for her husband may be implied from
the husband's absence under some circumstances. See SCHOULtR, MAUuAGX,
The
DIVoRcE, SEPARATION, AND DoMESTIc RmIATIONS (Ed. 6), §§ 135-145.

agency may be terminated by notice to the third party. Such notice was
imputed, where the wife's father was an officer of the bank where the husband kept his funds. When she checked out these funds after separation
from her husband the bank was held liable for the money paid to the wife,
although she had been accustomed to check against his account to pay current expenses of his business. Addison v. Dent County Savings Bank of
Salem (Mo. i92O), 226 S. W. 323. Where a wife deserted her husband and
vent to live with another man, her order of goods on the husband's credit,
with delivery at her changed address, was held to give the merchant notice
sufficient to terminate the agency. Swan v. Mathieson, 27 Times L. Rep. 153.
The principal case seems sound in holding that the husband's liability con-,
tinues, even after desertion by the wife, until notice of the fact to the merchant, since the liability is based upon the appearance from previous con-*
duct that the wife was authorized to act generally for her husband.
JURORS-RIkUSAL TO EXCLUM

JUROR HAVING AN OPINION AS To DvimNn-

GunT.-A statute provided that a juror having an opinion not posi,
tive in its character, or not based on personal knowledge of the facts, shall'
not be disqualified provided he swears he can render an impartial verdict
according to the evidence, and the court believes he can do so. The ques-"
tion was whether one who had formed an opinion from reading newspaper
accounts of a previous trial, but who swore that he could set his opinion
aside, and render a verdict according to the evidence, was disqualified. Held,
by a divided court, that, the opinion being founded on newspaper reports,
it would be a reflection upon a man's intelligence and integrity to find that
notwithstanding such opinion he would not be able to base his verdict solely
upon the evidence, when he swears he can do so, and the court believes him.
People v. Garner, (Mich., 1921), 184 N. W. 577.
The common law rule, as recognized in this country, did not require the
disqualification of a juror simply because he had formed an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused, but held him incompetent only in case
the opinion was so strong as to prevent him from rendering a verdict
according to the evidence. See note to Smith v. Raines, 36 Am. Dec. 522.
The statute involved in the principal case is declaratory of this principle,
and the question for 'the court to decide is whether the character of the
opinion is such as to disqualify. Whether an opinion formed from reading
newspaper reports is of such a character as would necessarily prevent a
juror from deciding a case according to the evidence is in conflict. The
majority of cases hold that an opinion based upon such information does
ANT'S
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not necessarily disqualify. State v. Baker, 33 W. Va. 3ig; State v. Ford,
37 La. Ann. 443. See note to Scribner v. State, 35 L. R. A. n. s. 985. The
reasoning upon which these cases rest is most aptly put by the West Virginia
court in State v. Baker, supra, saying that to disqualify such a juror "'would
put a premium upon ignorance, and a discount on reading and intelligence;
and the unbending application of such a rule would practically disable the
courts from securing juries of adequate capacity to fitly decide grave and
momentous causes." On the other hand there are several courts which hold
that an opinion based upon newspaper reports of a previous trial does disqualify. Greenfield v. People, 74 N. Y. 277; Stanp v. Commonwealth, 74
Pa. St. 458; State v. Cudler, 82 Mb. 623. The theory of these cases is that
the source of information is such that the juror cannot possibly set aside
his opinion, but will unconsciously be swayed by it. As said by the court in
Greenfield v. People, supra, "can that mind be unbiased in the second pondering, of the same testimony, which has already caused it to preponderate
and settle it to or towards a conclusion." The force of this argument cannot be denied, but justice would be more intelligently administered by applying the rule laid down in the principal case. On principle a juror should
never be disqualified simply because he has an opinion as to the merits of
the case. It is only when the opinion is so strong that the juror could not;
render an opinion according to the evidence, that he should be declared
incompetent
MARRiAGz--FRAUDULI.NT P PaSNTATIO-ANNULMgt.-Defendant induced the plaintiff to marry her by representing to him that her pregnancy
was the result of his illicit relations with her, though she then knew that
another was the cause of her condition. Plaintiff did nothing to investigate
the truth of her representations. Held, the fraud was ground for annulment
115 At. go.
of the marriage. Jackson v. Ruby, (Me., 12i),
Ordinarily a wife's pregnancy by another man at the time of her marriage, if unknown to her husband, is ground for annulment of the marriage,
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 6o5; Harrison v. Harrison, 94 Mich.
559. Contra, Moss v. Moss, (Eng.) 77 L. T. N. S. 220; but not where the
wife's condition, though unknown to the husband, is a result of his own
antenuptial incontinence. McCullo h v. McCulloch, 69 Tex. 682. The earlier
cases quite commonly refused to free a husband who had been guilty of
premarital incontinence with his wife, even though the marriage was induced
by the representations of the wife that her pregnancy was caused by him,
when she knew it was caused by another. In Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14
N. C. (3 Dev. L.) 535, where the husband and wife were white, and the
child born a mulatto, the court refused relief on the theory that public policy
required the preservation of the indissolubility of the marriage tie. But see
Barden v. Barden, 14 N. C. (3 Dev. L.) 548 and Bryamf v. Bryant, 171 N. C.
746. Some denied the petition of the husband on the ground that he did not
come into court with clean hands. States v. States, 37 N. J. Eq. 195; Seilheiiner v. Seilheimer, 4o N. J. Eq. 41Z. But this view has been rejected by
other courts on the theory that the gravamen of the complaint is not the
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illicit intercourse but the prior pregnancy and concealment concerning which
the deceived party is innocent Winner v. Winner, 171 Wis. 413; Lyman v.
Lyman, go Conn. 399. In Foss v. Foss, 12 Allen (Mass.) 26, where the parties had sexual intercourse at their second or third meeting and were married a short time later, relief was denied the husband. The court held that
his predicament was the result of his own "blind credulity" and that his
antenuptial relations with his wife and her condition were sufficient to put
a reasonable man on inquiry, necessitating some sort of investigation on his
part into the truth of her representations. Safford v. Safford, 224 Mass. 392.
See also, Franke v. Franke, (Cal.), 31 Pac. 571. In Winner v. Winner, supra,
the court annulled the marriage and though disapproving of the Massachusetts rule above, it distinguished the case on the ground that because of their
long comradeship and their engagement, the plaintiff acted reasonably in
relying on the representations of the defendant. The more recent cases
grant relief to the husband and reject the Massachusetts rule because of a
belief that it punishes too severely the wrongdoer who is making a praiseworthy attempt at retribution. Lyman v. Lyman, (1916) go Conn. 399;
Ritayik v. Ritayik, (I99) 2o2 Mo. App. 74; Wallace v. Wallace, (igo8) 137
Ia. 37, (involving a statute) ; Gard v. Gard, (i918) 204 Mich. 255, where the
defendant had informed the plaintiff of her intercburse with another. See
iS L. R. A. 375; L. R. A. 1916 E 643, 65o; ii A. L. R. 931.
MUNICIPAl,

ZONING--XC1,USION

or GAsoLINE

FiLrING

STATiON

FROm

RSIDMNT A , DisTRcp.-A statute authorized cities of the first class to establish
restricted residential districts and to provide that no buildings except residences, schoolhouses and churches should be erected within such districts without first securing a permit from the city council, such permit to be issued under
such reasonable rules and regulations as the city council might provide. An
ordinance of the city of Des Moines created such a district. Defendant
sought a permit to erect a gasoline filling station within said district, and
when it was refused proceeded to erect it without permission. The city
sued to enjoin him. It appeared that the corner where the station was to
be erected was an intersection from which five streets radiated, that one
corner wad occupied by a -park which was frequented by small children, and
that another corner was occupied by a church. Plaintiff contended that the
station would increase congestion of vehicles, would accentuate the noise
and confusion of ordinary street traffic to the disturbance of the inhabitants
and the church, that the disagreeable odors of gasoline would pervade the
neighborhood, that the drip of oil would befoul the streets, and that, in
general, the said business would be detrimental to the health, comfort, and
general welfare of the people making their homes in the district, and would
constitute a nuisance. Defendant denied that its business would constitute
a nuisance and contended that the refusal of the permit was unconstitutional.
Held, the refusal was a valid exercise of police power and defendant was
enjoined from erecting his filling station. City of Des Moines v. Manhattan
Oil Co., (Ia. 1921) 184 N. W. 823.
The question in the case was whether or not the regulations under
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which the defendant had been refused the permit were valid. This refusal
would be a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth
amendment unless it could be justified as a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. Is the police power of such scope as to warrant such restrictions on property owners in residential districts? That it may be invoked
to confine certain occupations to restricted districts when such regulation
may be necessary to protect the health, morals, and safety of the public is
well settled. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171. It may be
extended to control matters relating to general prosperity not included by
health, morals, and safety. C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 20o U. S.
561, 592. In dicta, at least, it has been extended to public comfort although
it is probable that that term has been used synonymously with "health." EX
parte Quoqng Wo, 161 Cal. 220. But it has been held that the police power
will not justify the withholding of a building permit merely because the proposed building is not of as good quality as the others in the neighborhood
or because its erection would decrease property values. Bostock v. Sants,
95 Md. 400. Nor have the aesthetic tastes of the neighborhood been considered sufficient to warrant the restriction of use of ,property. City of
Passaicv. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285. In that case the court
said, "Aesthetic considerations are matters of luxury and indulgence rather
than of necessity and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power."
However, there are indications in recent decisions that aesthetic considerations may at least be weighed in the balance along with other subjects
which are admittedly within the scope of the police power, Welch v. Swasey,
193 Mass. 364, 214 U. S. 91, and it is altogether probable that their weight
is increasing as time goes on. Somewhere in the range between public
safety and public pleasure there is a dividing line which is apparently shifting down the scale in such a way as to increase the scope of the police
power, and the gasoline filling station would seem to come extremely close
to this line as it is established today. It has been held that the use of property in residential districts for garage purposes may be prohibited. People
ex rel. Keller v. Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365.. On the other hand prohibiting a
small store building has been held invalid. State ex rel. Lachtntan v.
Houghton, 134 Minn. 26. The Iowa court in the principal case has placed
the filling station in the former class. It is impossible to determine from
the decision whether it did so because it considered such a station inimical
to public health and safety, or because it was expanding the scope of the
police power to include the hitherto immaterial considerations of aesthetic
tastes and decrease of property values. As to the former possibility, it
would seem that noise during church services and odors of gasoline could
hardly be called unhealthful, however unpleasant they may be. Nor does
the traffic congestion argument seem particularly cogent in justification of
it as a public safety measure. The decision may well be regarded as considerable expansion of police power to justify residential zone laws. For
a summary of recent cases on the subject see 19 MICH. L. Rzv. 191.
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NUISANCms-TuBRcuLosis

SANAoxU.-Defendant, a physician, was

conducting a tuberculosis sanatorium in a residential district of the city,
in close proximity to the homes of the plaintiffs. It was shown that the
property value was reduced 25 per cent because of the prevailing fear of
tuberculosis. Plaintiffs sought an injunction restraining the defendant from
conducting the sanatorium in this residential district. Held, that the sanatorium was not a nuisance per se, but became such by reason of its location in a residential district, and the court granted the injunction. Brink
v. Shepard, (1921) 215 Mich. 39o.

The general rule seems to be that a hospital, whether for treatment of
ordinary diseases or for the treatment of contagious and infectious ones,
is not a nuisance per se, though it may become such by reason of the place
of its location or because of the manner in which it is conducted. Frazer
v. Chicago, 186 Ill. 48o; Haag v. Vanderburgh Co., 6o Ind. 511; Cherry v.
Williams, 147 N. C. 452; Barry v. Smith, 191 Mass. 78. The establishment
of the hospital need not place the occupants of adjacent buildings in actual
danger of infection, but if they have a reasonable ground to fear such result
and the reasonable enjoyment of their property would be materially interfered with, relief will be granted. Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86; Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 Md. 352; Shepard v. Seattle, 59 Wash. 363.
As Chadwick, J., stated in the case of Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47,
"The question is not whether the fear is founded in science, but whether it
exists; not whether it is imaginary, but whether it is real, in that it affects
the conduct and movement of men." In a densely populated community a
hospital is undoubtedly a nuisance. Deacoiess Home v. Bonties, 207 Ili. 553;
Kestner v. Honteopathic Hospital, 245 Pa. St. 326; Cherry v. Williams, supra.
Thus, the decision of the court in the principal case seems to be sound and
in accord with the general trend of authorities.
PATZNT LAmW-InmA O MEANS A PART OF INV"NTION.-Originally bifocal
eye lenses were built up by combining two lenses in one frame. The result
was always an undesirable prismatic aberration at the division line between
the upper and lower fields. There had been early patents of a "single crystal
bi-focal," that is a single piece of glass with two fields ground upon it.
Such a lens would largely eliminate the aberration. However, great difficulty
was encountered in grinding such lenses, and the means of manufacture
suggested in the earlier patents had not proved practicable. Plaintiff patented a single crystal bi-focal and suggested a workable means of manufacture. Defendant discovered an entirely different means of making sub-

stantially equivalent lenses, and proceeded to manufacture them. Suit for
infringement. Defense, anticipation and non-infringement. Held, the px:ior
patents did not anticipate the plaintiff's patent; defendant was an infringer.
One Piece Bi-focal Lens Co. v. Stead, (1921) 274 Fed. 667.
In placing a patented article of manufacture on the market, there are
two distinct steps involved, first, the conceiving of the possibility of making
such a thing, and second, devising a way of making it. In order to decide
that the plaintiff's patent was not anticipated, the court must have concluded
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that plaintiff's means, or method, of manufacture was a necessary element
in his invention. It must have considered the plaintiff's product a totally
different article from those embodied in the earlier patents for the reason
that it was produced in an entirely different way. There can be no question
of the soundness of this conclusion. That the means of production is an
integral part of the patented product is supported by those cases which hold
that although someone else has previously suggested a useful and desirable
commodity, yet the one who actually devised the means of giving physical
existence to it is the original inventor. If the idea of the thing itself were
the patentable idea then the person who subsequently devised the means
of manufacture would have been anticipated, except as to his means. Pitts
v. Hall, 2 Blatch. 229. See also WAinr, PAUNT'5 LAW, p. 124-5. Furthermore, it would seem that the subject matter of the patent in the principal
case would, if it were not for the suggested means of production, be merely
a statement of a desirable result, namely the prevention of the line of
aberration by making the entire lens in one piece. That a mere result or
function of a device is not patentable is well settled. Risdon, Iron and
Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68. So the holding of the principal
cage in regard to anticipation is entirely satisfactory. But, as to infringement, it is clearly inconsistent. The defendant had used still a third means
of manufacture, and should have been given as much credit for his new
product as the plaintiff was given for his. It is true that the defendant's
product was substantially the same as the plaintiff's in physical characteristics, but the fact that it was made by an entirely new means gives it novelty in the eyes of patent law. Either plaintiff's patent was for the product,
regardless of the means of production,-in which case it was anticipated;
or it was for the product as produced by his means-in which case his patent did not cover the defendant's product as produced by different means.
SALIS-PossVSSIOrN NO' INDICIA o1 Tiri-.-P., the owner of an automobile, loaned it to Green and allowed the license to be renewed in Green's
name. Green then sold the car to D., an innocent purchaser. In a replevin
suit by P., hield, that possession alone was not indicia of ownership; that,
since it was not shown that D. knew that the license was issued in Green's
name, there was no evidence that P. "permitted the property to be disposed
of to an innocent purchaser under such circumstances as would lead an
ordinarily prudent person to believe that the property was rightfully sold,"
and the court should not have submitted the question of estoppel to the jury.
Forrest v. Benson, (Ark. 1921) 233 S. W. 916.
Chancellor Kent says that it is a maxim alike of the civil and common law
that nemo plues juris in alium transferre potest quain ipse habet. 2 Kent's
Com. 324. But although one cannot give what he does not have, still a
buyer may acquire an effective title -from a seller who had no title if the
original owner is estopped to deny that the seller had title. If the owner
of goods merely entrusts possession to another, he is not estopped to assert
title against an innocent purchaser from the one in possession, for mere
possession is not an indicium of ownership upon which the purchaser would
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have a right to rely entirely. Oyler v. Renfro, 86 Mo. App. 321; Ball Co. v.
Lane, 135 Mich. 275. But if the owner gives another not only the possession, but also other indicia of title-an apparent ownership-and if the purchaser knows of this apparent ownership and innocently acts upon it, the
doctrine of estoppel in; pais applies and the original owner cannot deny that
the seller had title. O'Connorv. Clark, 17o Pa. 318; Nixon. v. Brourn, 57 N,
H. 34. But in the principal case, one of the essential elements necessary to
create an estoppel was lacking, for although P. entrusted the seller with
possession and allowed him to renew the license in his name, there was no
evidence that the briyer knew of this fact and acted upon it.
WIns-PREsuMpTIoN or UNDUE INFLUENcE ARISING FROM FIDUCIARY
RELATION.-Testatrix made certain devises and bequests to the principal
defendant, Dr. Dinwiddie, who was her trusted confidential adviser and
practicing physician. The daughter of the testatrix contested the will on
the sole ground that Dinwiddie had exercised undue influence over the testatrix. Held, that where a fiduciary or confidential relationship is shown to
exist, the law presumes that the gift was the result of undue influence, and
the burden is thrown on the recipient of the gift, to show that it was not.
Burton, v. Holman, (Mo., 1921) 231 S. W. 630.
This case follows out the doctrine established in preceding Missouri
decisions on the subject of undue influence. Dausman v. Rankin, I89 Mo.
677; Grundmann v. Wilde, 255 Mo. iog. But this view seems to be contrary
to the great weight of authority in the United States. Claussenins v. Claussenius, 179 Ill. 545; Convey v. Murphy, 146 Ia. 154; In re Smith's Will, 72
N. Y. Sup. io9o; Caughey v. Bridenbaugt, 208 Pa. St. 414. The question of
undue influence being presumed from a "fiduciary or confidential relationship existing between the testator and the devisee or legatee under the will,
has arisen frequently in our courts, and several recent cases have been
decided contrary to the rule laid down in the principal case. In McCune
v. Reynolds, 288 Ill. 188, the court said, "the burden rests upon the contestant
to prove the charge of undue influence. This cannot be done by the establishment, alone, of a fiduciary relation between the testator and the beneficiaries * * * this does not put upon them the burden of showing an absence
of fraud or undue influence"' it re Dale's Estate, 92 Ore. 57, held that,
while a confidential relation between the testator and the beneficiary was a
circumstance to be taken into consideration, it did not in itself create a presumption that undue influence had been exerted. To the same effect are,
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Van Etten, go N. J. Eq. 612, and Downey
v. Guilfoile, 93 Conn. 63o. The Downtey case is commented on in 29 YALt
L. J. 133. That unnatural disposition of property does not show testamentary
incapacity is held in Whitman's Est. (S. D. ig2i) 184 N. W. 975.

